Category Archives: Information

General news/information to the CAcert community or about security in general

Date of Birth information handling by CAcert

Date of Birth information is needed for operational purposes and could not be dropped.

CAcert takes strong measures to maintain and guard your private information. Currently CAcert uses for individuals the full formal name, date of birth (DoB) and email/domain address(es). The DoB is used for discrimination of similar names of individuals.

A long debate on the CAcert policy email list (email:cacert-policy@cacert.org) discussed the issue if date of birth could be dropped from the archive. Alternatives for purpose of name discrimination were explored and debated upon. But it did not result in an accepted and efficient alternative.

CAcert made the decision to comply fully with the European privacy directive (EU DPA). The DoB information is however felt to be archived and needed for operational measurements at Assurance time (Web-of-Trust) and later. Alternatives, which are hopefully better in the name resolution, will continue to be investigated and solutions are challenged for.

It is noticed that the date of birth information is commonly used in the internet environment (and even more private information is made available) and that this data is poorly managed. Even some (European) governments are providing this information openly in some instances. The data of birth (and even email addresses) are only available to CAcert Assurers and only in times of assurance requests and arbitration cases if needed so. There are binding policies for the Assurers for doing so, subjected to arbitration.

Archived copies of Identity Documents should be destroyed within CAcert.

CAcert will destroy archived copies of ID’s and asks their Assurers to do so as well.

When CAcert started in 2002 it was required that copies of ID’s were archived for 7-10 years in the archives of CAcert or archives of CAcert Assurers. In a later instance CAcert required to take note of ID numbers and/or social security numbers of the individual instead of the copy of the ID.  In 2006 for privacy reasons this data (copy of ID, personal numbers) was dropped. The CAcert Assurance Programme (CAP) form states however that the information should be kept 7-10 years.

As CAcert Inc. dropped the requirements for copies of ID and personal numbers the CAcert Inc. association by order of the Committee (Board) decided to remove this information from the CAcert archives and require that the CAcert Assurers who are in possession of that information to do the same: destroy archived copies of ID’s and delete social security numbers from the CAP forms. The information should be deleted with care as stated in the CAP agreement.

Warning on weak keys and random numbers

Regarding the recently discovered random number vulnerability:

CAcert’s root keys are not affected, since they were created before the bug existed.
CAcert’s internal systems were affected, and are currently being cleaned up.
A lot of our users are affected.
We are currently working on improved methods to detect the vulnerabilities and inform the affected users about them.
In general, digital signatures and certificates are only affected in the case the any of the underlying keys are compromised. Signatures and certificates do not contain any additional random numbers, so they can’t be affected on their own, if the keys are not compromised.

We currently think that the articles in the media hasn’t informed everyone about the whole impact of the problem yet.

The affected distributions contain Debian, Ubuntu, Kubuntu, Knoppix, Grml, and various other Debian based distributions.
Also various embedded systems that are based on Debian are likely affected.

Regarding the applications, OpenSSL, OpenVPN, OpenXPKI, OpenCA, OpenSSH (especially client authorisation keys!), boxbackup and various other software packages are affected.

All systems that are relying on keys that were generated on affected systems are affected.
This means that you should scan all your SuSE, Fedora, Redhat, BSD, … SSH-servers for compromised keys in the authorized keys files of all users, and blacklist the compromised keys accordingly. (And the same for any other services that might rely on the compromised keys.)

If you want to assess the quality of your own random number generator, you can use our free service here:
http://www.cacert.at/random/

We are currently developing a X.509 vulnerability detection system, which will be available for all CA’s, to discover similarly compromised keys as early as possible. If you want to participate and help there, please contact us.
http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/HashServer

Message to all non-Debian-derived vendors: Please ship blacklists and blacklist-detection software in your security updates. (Port ssh-vuln to your distribution, …) And warn your users too, not to rely on compromised keys anymore.

General information about the vulnerability:

http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys
http://www.debian.org/security/key-rollover/
http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1571

CAcert wieder auf dem Linuxtag 2008 in Berlin

der Linuxtag 2008 vom 28.Mai bis 31.Mai in Berlin steht vor der Tür.
CAcert wird hier auch wieder mit einem Stand vertreten sein an dem sich Interressierte Besucher informieren und assuren lassen können.

Assurer und Interressierte, die gerne helfen wollen sollten sich bitte schnellstmöglich unter http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/LinuxTag2008 erintragen, damit der Stand und ggf. Eintrittskarten geplant werden kann.

CAcert Assurances on the Penguicon Convention, USA, Michigan, Detroit(Troy)

At the Penguin Convention in Michigan there will be a keysigning party for Michigan and the
surrounding cities (Flint, Lansing etc.). Penguicon is open to the public, but registration is now at the door only for this year.  Penguicon will take place next weekend, April 18-20. in Michigan, US and the details can be found on the official website.  The keysigning portion will take place on Saturday.
More information on the Penguicon Website (http://www.penguicon.org/).