It is not only the computers of the future that pose a threat to security, it is also the legacy of the past. Over the past two or three decades, it has become clear time and again that the majority of Internet users are struggling to replace insecure protection mechanisms. It usually takes more than ten years to introduce an improved security protocol on a large scale. If the fear of quantum computers helps to overcome this inertia, i.e. if the efforts of post-quantum cryptography are conducive to “crypto-agility”, then these novel computers have proven to be useful – even if they will never exist.

The grid-based cryptographic methods are considered to be very secure. This assessment is based on theoretical considerations and mathematical calculations. At the Institute for Microelectronics and Embedded Systems at the University of Applied Sciences of Eastern Switzerland, the focus is less on mathematical theories than on the way in which these theories are technically implemented. On the one hand, the researchers in Rapperswil (on the Lake Zurich, Switzerland) want to advance the development of fast computer chips for post-quantum cryptography. On the other hand, they also want to analyse the security of such systems. “Some algorithms that look good on paper,” explains Dorian Amiet, “prove vulnerable in practice to so-called side-channel attacks. Amiet has been working as a project member in Rapperswil for about two years on programming aspects of post-quantum cryptography.

For side-channel attacks, the Rapperswil researchers like to use an oscilloscope, a measuring device that makes electrical voltage fluctuations visible. This is because every algorithm, when used on computer hardware, is dependent on electricity. Sometimes an analysis of voltage fluctuations allows conclusions to be drawn about the inner workings of a computer program and the data it processes.

In a new paper, Amiet and other colleagues deal with “Newhope”. This grid-based method had been developed by major European companies and universities and was considered a favourite in the nesting selection process until recently. But in the Rapperswil laboratory this software did not cut a good figure. Under certain circumstances, the secrets that had been entrusted to this software could be read with the naked eye on the oscilloscope.

“Newhope” did not make it to the third and final round of nest evaluation. And the attack that brought “Newhope” to its knees in Rapperswil also works against “Crystals-Kyber” from IBM. Amiet plans to present this new finding at an international conference on post-quantum cryptography in September.

When will quantum computers be ready for use? Employees of the American consulting firm Rand Corp. have undertaken to confront 15 experts with this question as part of the aforementioned study. On average, the commissioning of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is set for the year 2033. But the answers vary widely. There are experts who see this technology coming as early as 2022 or 2023, others believe that quantum computers will remain a chimera forever.

Andreas Curiger is also one of the doubters. The electrical engineer – co-founder and head of technology at the young Zurich security company Securosys SA – compares these computers to nuclear fusion reactors: In both cases, he says, despite decades of research, they are still far from being used in practice. Curiger does not believe that he will be dealing with a functional quantum computer in his professional life. Nevertheless, he is committed to the development of post-quantum cryptography. His company cooperates in research with the Rapperswil Institute for Microelectronics and Embedded Systems.

Securosys sells devices for the protection of data transmission, which are used by banks for the authentication and verification of financial transactions, for example. These customers appreciate the fact that these devices have been developed and manufactured entirely in Switzerland. Together with researchers from Rapperswil, Curiger wanted to find out what effort is required to adapt the Securosys devices to post-quantum cryptography. “It looks good,” says Curiger, “we were able to develop the prototype of a quantum-safe hardware module.”

Grid-based methods are currently raising great expectations in the development of cryptography that is secure from quantum computers. Mathematicians associate grids with a number of difficult tasks involving the measurement of vector spaces. The difficulty of these problems increases exponentially with the complexity of the grid. For cryptographic applications, grids with hundreds of dimensions are used.

One of the first to make mathematical grids usable for cryptography was the Hungarian-American computer scientist Miklós Ajtai, who worked at the IBM research centre in Almaden. In the mid-1990s, he opened the door to a new field of cryptography. Shortly after the turn of the millennium, grid cryptography was still the work of a small group of researchers, reports the Italian-American computer scientist Daniele Micciancio in a YouTube lecture. In the meantime, one has to read more than 100 essays a year to keep track of this rapidly expanding field of research.

Vadim Lyubashevsky is one of the researchers who have excelled here. He worked with Micciancio at the University of California in San Diego as a doctoral student. Today, he conducts research at the IBM research laboratory in Rüschlikon on the Lake Zurich, Switzerland.

The IBM researcher has done much to transform the lattice theory, which has been developed over the past 25 years, into computer software that is relevant to practice. According to Lyubashevsky, a so-called Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices (Crystals) is already being used internally by IBM, but also by Google and Cisco for testing purposes. It has been shown that these programs work very efficiently, they are faster than conventional cryptographic methods. Only the memory requirements are slightly higher because the keys are longer.

IBM has not only developed software, but also hardware: the prototype of a tape drive can store encrypted data on 20-TByte tape cartridges in a way that cannot be converted into plain text even by quantum computers.

However, such products cannot be commercialised as long as there are no binding standards for post-quantum cryptography that ensure the interaction of hardware and software components from different manufacturers. The computer world is therefore waiting for the American National Institute of Standards (Nist) to complete a long-term evaluation of quantum-safe cryptographic procedures. An important milestone has just been reached in this process: at the end of July, the American authority announced the end of the second round of evaluation.

When the Nist began to deal with quantum-secure cryptography in 2015, 82 proposals were available for selection. After two evaluation rounds, 7 algorithms remained, including several proposals from IBM. According to the latest Nist evaluation report, the grid-based proposals are considered the most promising. After a third round, which is expected to take 12 to 18 months, binding standards should finally be in place by the end of 2021.

In 1994, the American mathematician Peter Shor was able to show that quantum computers, which were still hypothetical at the time, could greatly accelerate the decomposition of prime factors. Thus, the security of asymmetric encryption is no longer guaranteed. New encryption methods have to be developed that can withstand the quantum computers: Post-quantum cryptography is needed.

It is not possible to wait until the new computers are ready for use and then solve the security problems they raise. For one thing, the development of cryptographic procedures takes time. On the other hand, data sometimes have a long life span. If their confidentiality has to be guaranteed for decades, it is essential to develop an idea today of what tools will be available to an attacker in ten or twenty years’ time. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that malicious actors are already hoarding encrypted data today in order to read them in plain text later, when quantum computers become available.

The fact that the dangers that quantum computers pose to cryptography have been discussed for a long time, and that it may take a long time before these dangers become real, weakens the awareness of the problem in some places; this “long time and not for a long time” lends many people a false sense of security. But the task of dealing with post-quantum cryptography can no longer be put off any longer.

“The danger is acute,” says the introduction to a report published in April by the American consulting firm Rand Corp. “Quantum computers pose a threat to every government agency, all critical infrastructures and all branches of industry.” This is a new type of threat that is not comparable to conventional security problems. It is directed against the very foundations of the Internet. It threatens to be a “quantum disaster”, an author of the study told journalists. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) also sees an “acute need for action” with regard to post-quantum cryptography.